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RIGHT TO etCOUNSEL
al.: Right to Counsel
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
have Assistance of Counselfor his defence.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6:
In any trialin any country whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions ....

COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Carracedo'
(decided May 6, 1997)
Defendant, Jose Carracedo, (during a pretrial suppression
hearing at the trial court level) was told by the judge not to
communicate with his counsel concerning the case.2 This
direction was given to the defendant in the middle of the his
cross-examination testimony.' This directive by the judge was to
last for the overnight recess in the case, and was not for an
extended period of time. Defendant was ultimately convicted of
Defendant appealed the conviction
second-degree murder.'
contending that he was denied a fair trial because of the ban that
was placed on his ability to communicate with his attorney during
The Appellate Division found the
the overnight recess .
defendant's contention to have merit and held that "the ban

681 N.E.2d 1276, 659 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1997).
at 1061, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 831.

189 N.Y.2d 1059,

2 Id.

3Id.
4Id.
5Id.
6Id.
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placed on defendant's communication with his attorney violated
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel" .7
In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Division relied on
Geders v. United States,8 where the defendant in a federal drug
prosecution was directed by a district court judge not to talk to
his counsel, or anyone about the case, during a seventeen hour
overnight recess during his direct examination and shortly before
his cross-examination was to begin. 9 His counsel objected but the
defendant was ultimately convicted.'0 The Court explained that it
is common for an attorney to consult with a client during recesses
in order to go over what has occurred at trial that day." The end
of the day is often a time when much work is accomplished
between the two in terms of strategy, as well as the attorney's
quest for information which is based on that day's testimony or
matters in which the attorney has not fully explored before with
his client. 12 The Court "recognized that the role of counsel is
important

because ... a

defendant

is

[not]

equipped

to

understand and deal with the trial process without the lawyer's
guidance."1 3 The Court held that an order that prohibited a
defendant from talking to his counsel during a seventeen-hour
overnight recess "between his direct and cross-examination
impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment." 14
Finding a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the
Appellate Division stayed the appeal and remitted the matter to
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id. See also N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to appear and defend in person
and with counsel .... ." Id. (Carracedo, 89 N.Y.2d at 1061, 681 N.E.2d at
1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 831).
8 425 U.S. 80 (1975).
9

Id. at 81.
Id.at 85.
11Id.
0

12 id.

13

Id. (citing

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Argersinger v.

Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
14Id.at 91.
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the Supreme Court of New York for a new suppression hearing. "S
The new suppression hearing resulted in a finding that the subject
and the Appellate Division
evidence should not be suppressed
16
conviction.
affirmed defendant's
On appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that it could not review
the appropriateness of the Appellate Division's holding that the
directive constituted a Sixth Amendment violation since the
People did not appeal.17 The Court of Appeals then explained, it
could not give them relief. 8 The court further explained that by
doing so it "would in essence be affording affirmative relief to a
nonappealing party, [which] we are not empowered to do."' 9

15 Car.racedo, 89 N.Y.2d at 1061, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at
831.
6
1 1d.
17Id.

Id.
'9 Id. (quoting People v. Carpentino, 80 N.Y.2d 65, 68, 599 N.E.2d 668,
669, 587 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 (1992)). In Carpentino, defendant was indicted
on charges of drug possession, weapons possession, and criminal possession of
a hypodermic instrument. Id. at 67, 599 N.E.2d at 669, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence and challenged certain
statements made by an informant as perjurious. Id. Defendant also requested
an in camera hearing in advance of trial to look into the existence of the
informant. Id. The court granted the motion only to the extent of ordering of
a hearing regarding the existence of the informant. Id. The People were
unable to produce the informant and moved to reargue the portion of the
Id.
decision in which the Judge granted the in camera examination.
Defendant moved, once again, that the physical evidence seized be suppressed.
Id. This request was granted and the People appealed. Id. The Appellate
Division reversed, holding that the in camera hearing was not improper but the
hearing court should not have ordered the evidence suppressed without looking
to alternative evidence of the informant's existence (the People wanted to put a
detective under oath to disclose who the informant was and to testify to his
conversations with the informant). Id. at 67-68, 599 N.E.2d at 669, 587
N.Y.S.2d at 265. The People argued that the hearing court should not have
allowed an in camera hearing in the first place. Id. at 68, 599 N.E.2d at 669,
587 N.Y.S.2d at 265. The court then held that they could not consider that
argument by the People because if the court were to say that the hearing judge
did abuse his power in ordering the examination it would be affording relief to
a nonappealing party. Id.
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The Court of Appeals in Carracedo rejected defendant's
contention that he deserved a reversal of his conviction and
receive a new trial.' ° The court stated that the new suppression
hearing was an adequate remedy that cured any constitutional
violation which may have occurred at the original suppression
hearing. 2 Also, the court noted that the occurrence of the
communication ban lasted for one evening and occurred one year
before the trial began and in the scheme of the entire matter was
not serious enough to deny the defendant of a fundamental right
to a fair trial.22 Thus, there was no need to proceed with an
analysis to determine whether the defendant was, in fact,
prejudiced by the actions taken by the court.25
In People v. Hilliard,2' the New York Court of Appeals held

that a 30 day pretrial bar on communications was a denial of a
fundamental right to a fair trial.25 Also, in People v. Felder,26
20

Carracedo, 89 N.Y.2d at 1061, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at

831.

Id. at 1061-62, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
22 Id. at 1062, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
1 Id. (citing People v. Hilliard, 73 N.Y.2d 584, 540 N.E.2d 702, 542
N.Y.S.2d 507 (1989); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295,
391 N.E.2d 1274 (1979)). In Hilliard, the defendant was arrested and then
arraigned. Id. at 586, 540 N.E.2d 702, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 507. While being
arraigned, defendant continually failed to comply with the Judge's orders to
remain quiet. Id. The Judge then found him in contempt of court and ordered
his counsel not to have any contact with him for 30 days following the
arraignment. Id. The People conceded that the Judges orders were in error
but they were harmless, however, the court held that this was a violation of his
constitutional right to counsel after such right had attached at arraignment. Id.
The court's order was punitive and without justification, thus denying him his
constitutional right to a fair trial and not harmless. Id. at 586, 540 N.E.2d at
702-03, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08. The court held that this error could not be
remedied by a new trial and ordered that the order of the Appellate Division
should be reversed and the indictment against him should be dismissed. Id.
24 73 N.Y.2d 584, 540 N.E.2d 702, 542 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1989). See supra
note 23.
25 Id. at 586-87, 540 N.E.2d at 702-03, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
26 47 N.Y.2d 287, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1979). In Felder,
four defendants sought to vacate their convictions on the grounds that they
were denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. Their claims came from the
fact that all were represented by the same counsel in separate criminal trials by
21
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the court held that where a defendant in a criminal trial has

unknowingly been represented by a layman who is masquerading
as an attorney his conviction must be set aside without regard to
whether he was individually prejudiced by such representation.
In Carracedo, unlike Hilliard, the ban was only for a night and
was during the course of the suppression hearing, while giving
testimony on cross-examination; not at trial and certainly not for
an extended period of time. 27
Defendant further contended that the ban on his communication
was prejudicial because it could have affected his trial strategy
and was at a time in the litigation process when he and his
counsel could have discussed plea options or have gone over
issues that were coming up later at trial.2 The court however
found defendant's arguments to be too speculative and held that
the Appellate Division's finding that a new suppression hearing
was a sufficient remedy.29
Finally, defendant contented that reversal was called for
because the People lost certain Rosario materials 0 prepared by
the trainer of a dog that was used to track Carracedo to the scene
of the crime. 3' The court responded by explaining that "when
Rosario materials are lost or destroyed, the court is required to
the same man, Albert Silver, who had not been admitted to practice law. Id.
The Court of Appeals in each case reversed the order of the Appellate Division
and granted the motion to vacate the judgment of conviction. Id. The court
ordered a new trial holding that where a defendant in a criminal trial has
unknowingly been represented by a layperson who is masquerading as an
attorney his conviction must be set aside without regard to whether he was
individually prejudiced by such representation. Id.
27 Carracedo, 89 N.Y.2d at 1061, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at
831.
28 Id. at 1062, 681 N.E.2d at 1277, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
291Id.
at 1061-62, 681 N.E. at 1277-78, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 831-32.
o See generally People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213
N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961). Rosario materials are those materials required to be
disclosed to defense counsel for use in cross-examination and all pre-trial
statements of witnesses relating to the subject matter of their testimony,
whether made to police, District Attorney, Grand Jury, unless it is confidential
and needs to be keep as such. Id.
31 Carracedo, 89 N.Y.2d at 1062, 681 N.E.2d at 1278, 659 N.Y.S.2d at
832.
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impose a sanction designed to eliminate resulting prejudice to the
defendant." 32 In the case at bar, any possible prejudice by the
loss of evidence was cured by special jury instructions.33 The
court relied on People v. Martinez,34 which stated that "[t]he
determination of what is [an] appropriate [remedy] is committed
to the trial court's sound discretion ....

[T]he court's attention

should focus primarily on the overriding need to eliminate
prejudice to the defendant." 35 The court also pointed to the case
of People v. Kelly, 36 in which the Court of Appeals decided that a
dismissal of two informations, which charged defendants with
criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, was an
inappropriate response to the prosecutions' failure to produce a
stolen wallet.3 7 The wallet was to be used at trial against the
defendants because it was on their possession at the time of
arrest.3 8 The court in Kelly stated that the definition of
"appropriate action" is to be committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, "as a general matter the drastic remedy of
dismissal should not be invoked where a less severe measure[
can rectify the harm done by the loss of the evidence." 39 The
court noted that there were such other remedies available and that
the lower court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges. 4"
Here, the court held that any possible prejudice by the loss of
evidence was cured by the special jury instructions. The de novo
suppression hearing was an adequate remedy for the trial court's
direction to the defendant that he refrain from communicating
with his counsel during the overnight recess. The defendant,
according to the Court of Appeals, did not show that there was
any potential for prejudice at the suppression hearing stage.
32 Id.
33

1d. The trial court instructed the jury to use "utmost caution" and that the
evidence had "slight probative value". Id.
34 71 N.Y.2d 937, 524 N.E.2d 134, 528 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1988).

35 Id. at 940, 524 N.E.2d at 136, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 815.

36 62 N.Y.2d 516, 467 N.E.2d 498, 478 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1984).
37 Id.

at 518-19, 467 N.E.2d 499, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 835.

38 Id.
39

Id. at 521, 467 N.E.2d at 501, 478 N.Y.S.2d 837.

40 Id.
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Thus, the Court of Appeals held that this was not a violation of
the defendants' right to counsel. The defendant's final argument
for the reversal of his conviction due to the missing Rosario
material by the State, was put to rest because the Court of
Appeals found that the instructions to the jury cured any prejudice
that may have effected the defendant.
People v. Cohen41
(decided October 30, 1997)
The defendant, Benjamin E. Cohen, was convicted in 1996 in
the County Court, Warren County upon entering a plea of guilty
to murder in the second degree.42 The plea was entered "after
the County Court denied his omnibus motion to suppress physical
evidence and his inculpatory statement pertaining to the murder
of a store clerk" 43 and the defendant was sentenced to a prison
term of twenty-five years to life."4
Defendant appealed the denial of the suppression motion to the
Appellate Division, which unanimously affirmed 5 and then was
granted leave to appeal to the New York State Court of
Appeals. 46 Defendant argued that the physical evidence should
have been suppressed because the warrant that authorized the
seizure was invalid as it was obtained based on a false statement
given by an informant. 47 He also argued that his right to counsel
under the New York State Constitution4 8 had been violated when
90 N.Y.2d 632, 687 N.E.2d 1313, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1997).
41 People v. Cohen, 226 A.D.2d 903, 640 N.Y.S.2d 921 (3d Dep't 1996).
41

The New York Statute for murder in the second degree is embodied in New
York Penal Law § 125.25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1998).
43 Id. at 903, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
44 Id. at 906, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
Id.
People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632, 634-35, 687 N.E.2d 1313, 1314, 665
N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (1997).
47
Id.at 636, 687 N.E.2d at 1315, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
48 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state
45
46
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